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In an unusually candid episode of Meet the Press, U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden came out 
against the official Democratic Party line on same-sex marriage. In contrast to President 
Obama’s insistence that his views on the controversial issue were still “evolving,” Biden 
stated that he was “absolutely comfortable with the fact that men marrying men, women 
marrying women, and heterosexual men marrying women are entitled to the same exact 
rights.” Biden’s gaffe – as it was widely described in the press – rapidly led President 
Obama to clarify his position and to affirm his support for same-sex marriage.  
 
Jeffrey Edward Green’s ambitious The Eyes of the People attempts to found democratic 
politics on the value of candor and to reshape politics so gaffes of the sort committed by 
Biden become more common. He seeks to move away from a model of democracy based on 
the voice of the people to a plebiscitary model in which politicians are subject to the 
people’s gaze and forced to relinquish control over their public appearances. By reviving 
plebiscitary democracy, Green addresses one of the great challenges for democratic theory: 
to explain what rule by the many might mean in a large society. In the ancient Athenian 
polis, most citizens could expect to hold office in their lifetimes and all citizens had the 
opportunity to raise their voice in the assembly. Today, most citizens never directly 
participate in the government even at the local level and enjoy only limited and indirect 
opportunities to express their views. Not surprisingly, many people are politically 
uninformed and apathetic, exhibiting limited knowledge of policy and often failing to vote. 
Even more worryingly, much of the voting population does not have defined political 
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preferences or attitudes on many issues. For this reason, policy makers cannot represent the 
will of the people because there is no will to represent. 
 
How should democratic theorists respond? Green argues that the dominant – indeed 
hegemonic – model of democracy is based upon autonomy and voice. Citizens express their 
preferences through voting and/or deliberation and this influences the content of laws. 
Under this paradigm, citizens can be seen as both authors and subjects of the law. Of course, 
in large states people do not usually directly authorize the law, so democratic theorists must 
explain how it is possible to see the people as authors as well as subjects. Theorists who 
think that mass democratic institutions are generally laudable generally argue that the 
political system tracks people’s views or interests with reasonable reliability. Even though 
citizens don’t directly authorize laws and policies, there is a form of accountability through 
voting or through the political activities of interest groups. Theorists who are more skeptical 
about the status quo propose ways to give people more effective voices, sometimes by 
advocating the creation of new deliberative institutions. 
 
Green rejects both of these strategies and seeks to develop a democratic theory in which the 
ordinary citizen is involved in politics primarily as a spectator. His goal is to revive a theory 
of plebiscitary democracy that engages democratic theory from the perspective of the 
political spectator instead of the political actor. Green seeks to replace models of democracy 
that focus on empowering the people by incorporating their voice with an ocular model that 
privileges sight. This involves a reinterpretation and revival of Max Weber’s writings on 
plebiscitary democracy. 
 
Chapter 1 introduces, outlines, and motivates Green’s account of ocular democracy. Chapter 
2 argues for the need for a theory of democracy that takes the citizen-spectator seriously as 
a major political figure. Chapter 3 analyzes the philosophical tradition, particularly 
Rousseau, Publius, Bentham and James Mill, and J.S. Mill, to argue for the traditional 
dominance of the vocal model. It also aims to show how twentieth-century political 
scientists such as V.O. Key and Bernard Manin explicitly or implicitly retain the vocal 
paradigm. Chapter 4 describes and attempts to revive plebiscitary democracy, largely 
through an analysis of Shakespeare’s Roman plays Julius Caesar and Coriolanus. Chapter 5 
contains an extended exposition of Max Weber’s plebiscitarian democracy and a discussion 
of what Green considers as its misapplication in the work of Carl Schmitt and Joseph 
Schumpeter. Chapter 6 provides some cursory proposals for reforming democracy under the 
plebiscitarian model and Chapter 7 ends with a brief reply to potential critics along with 
some final remarks in favor of the model. 
 
Green’s account of democracy requires some elaboration. Green follows Weber and 
Schumpeter by beginning with an empirical account of our actual democracies and only 
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then providing a normative model. On his analysis, citizens are spectators, not participants, 
and the most that can be said about “citizen-spectators” is that they are interested in political 
events portrayed in the mass media. He is critical of democratic theorists who begin with a 
normative ideal of citizens who participate in politics, arguing that this ignores how most 
citizens experience politics. Rather, he seeks to rehabilitate a model of “democracy” that 
many theorists would consider undemocratic. His goal is to provide a theory for the 
“citizen-being-ruled,” i.e., for people that he describes as “political spectators linked 
together in their shared experience of nondecision, nonpreference, and relative 
subordination to political elites” (63). 
 
What is particularly unusual about his account is that he sees himself as committed to a 
progressive democratic theory based on the critical standard of “candor,” defined as “the 
principle that leaders not control the conditions of their publicity” (19). Weber and 
Schumpeter’s theories in which elites compete for votes are not generally thought to be 
progressive, but rather an accommodation to the rise of bureaucracy and mass society. 
Insofar as their accounts of plebiscitary democracy provide a normative ideal to evaluate 
and criticize political institutions, they are largely limited to checking the most egregious 
abuses of elites. 
 
Green argues that Weber’s plebiscitary democracy has normative resources that are 
frequently overlooked. Green follows Weber in rejecting the ideal of autonomy for ordinary 
citizens and replacing it with the ideal of candor for leaders. Rather than asking whether 
politicians respond to the interests of the people, we ask if they possess the personal traits of 
good leaders. We should understand democracy as a relationship between the leader who 
struggles to achieve the support of the people through public appearances, the mass media, 
and public inquiries. What is crucial in Weber’s model is that politicians must not be able to 
control how the public sees them through public relations; rather, they must be subjected to 
the public gaze under conditions that they can’t control. For this reason, the fundamental 
value in Green’s plebiscitarian model is candor. To achieve candor, Green draws on Michel 
Foucault’s account of disciplinary power and his concept of the gaze which “does not 
compel so much as it molds a particular kind of personality” (154). Green briefly 
supplements Weber’s account with practical suggestions that include reshaping leadership 
debates to include more competition so that candidates cannot unilaterally shape their 
images, maximizing public inquires to keep leaders in the public gaze under circumstances 
they do not control, and designing presidential press conferences to remove control from 
leaders. 
 
Green’s Eyes of the People surveys a broad terrain of political theory, ranging from 
historical explorations of major figures from Aristotle to the present, forays into the 
empirical literature on political participation, and discursions on literature. It is an original 
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work and an impressive synthesis of the tradition. Nonetheless, I have a number of 
reservations about the attempt to reframe democratic theory on the ocular model. 
 
First, Green’s point of departure of the citizen as spectator requires more argument than he 
provides. He claims that democratic theorists, if they are to take seriously the experience of 
everyday citizens, must give value to their role as spectators. This is a conservative position 
and by no means an obvious one. Deliberative democrats, for example, also claim that they 
start from the experience of everyday citizens, but instead focus on their apathy and 
frustration with political processes that refuse to grant ordinary people any more role than 
that of consumers of mass media. If we are to follow Green, we should be convinced that 
attempts to expand voice through the reformation of political institutions are largely futile. 
Unfortunately, Green largely neglects the growing literature on empirically grounded 
deliberative and participatory institutions that arguably give people a more effective voice. 
The tradition of seeing democracy as based in voice is based on a compelling insight about 
the value of citizen input in decision making and we should be reluctant to abandon it unless 
we are convinced that it is futile. 
 
Second, Green sees one of his contributions as restoring meaning to the notion of “the 
People.” Instead of the People being unified by a common good or by common interests, the 
People as Green understands them share their status as spectators observing politicians 
through the mass media. The People share a “form of political experience” and Green sees 
himself as reviving the notion of popular sovereignty based in shared spectatorship. But 
what is notable about this conception of the People is that it is empty – as in Bentham’s 
panopticon, what is needed is not actual observers with defined characteristics and interests, 
but only the supposition that there is an observer. This raises a deep question about Green’s 
project: how far can a theory depart from the conviction that citizens are in some respect 
authors of the law and deserve to be described as “democratic?” If “the People” only 
signifies an empty place holder for an abstract, observing entity, democratic theory is better 
off not positing a unified people and instead attending to the diverse and fragmented 
interests of the populace. Green’s vision of the People serves only as a check on power and 
is as equally suited to a mixed constitution or oligarchy as to a democratic society. 
 
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, Green’s normative ideal of “candor” is 
underdeveloped and not obviously appealing. Green appeals to a relational concept of 
charisma in which the leader receives legitimacy from public acknowledgement, but says 
little about the relationship between spectators and actors or why candor should lead to 
desirable political results. One danger with Green’s under-theorized notion of candor is that 
it might lead to the elevation of undesirable leaders. We should ask how far Green is able to 
distance himself from the danger of the plebiscite raising authoritarian leaders to power. His 
examples of candor include Shakespeare’s Coriolanus and Julius Caesar and Weber’s 
Essays Philos (2012) 13:2                                                                                                                 Sager | 594 
 
 
 
writings on the Hebrew prophets. These exemplars are not Carl Schmitt’s Führer, but they 
should hardly reassure democratic theorists worried about the fetishization of the 
charismatic leader.  
 
There is also the opposite concern. Green is insufficiently critical of the potentially 
undesirable side-effects of candor. It is not clear that we want leaders to be exposed to the 
public gaze, at least at all times. One reason may be that leaders’ character as revealed to the 
public eye may not be related to their effectiveness as leaders. Indeed, it is a common tactic 
in politics to discredit rivals by revealing unsavory aspects of their personal lives. Unsavory 
personal revelations about politicians are arguably disturbing, but not necessarily relevant to 
their role as political leaders. Moreover, it is not clear that there is a correlation between 
being able to effectively compete before the public for power and the ability to govern well. 
At the very least, the relationship between candor and good governance requires further 
investigation and elaboration. 
 
Furthermore, it is not clear why candor would lead to good policy. Consider the example of 
Vice President Biden straying from the official party line on same-sex marriage. Though the 
political zeitgeist has probably changed so that Biden’s gaffe is unlikely to have a major 
effect on the issue, under other circumstances it might have undermined LGBT rights by 
giving conservative opponents fodder for their legislation. Candor could harden positions 
and prevent the necessary compromise needed for politics. Plebiscitary democracy’s focus 
on politicians attributes too much power and influence to the spectacle of politics and not 
enough attention to how policy is actually made. The point is not to dismiss candor as an 
important political value, but to contend that it needs to be more fully theorized. 
 
Though this review is critical of Green’s book, Eyes of the People is a challenging work 
with an impressive command of the democratic tradition. Green’s criticisms of theorists’ 
reliance on the vocal mode of power are formidable and his reinterpretation of Max Weber 
deserves engagement. He has also done us a service by drawing attention to the value of 
candor and reopened a topic that deserves serious consideration, even if Weberian 
democracy should ultimately be resisted. 
